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ÜBERSEERING:  A EUROPEAN 
COMPANY PASSPORT  
INTRODUCTION  
Today more than ever, market players realize that entering 
into business transactions with “foreigners” involves more 
than a mere exchange of goods and services….freedom of es-
tablishment and the abolition of national barriers bring inten-
sified competition. Consequently, company managers are 
urged to take daring initiatives: a complete transfer of busi-
ness undertakings might well turn out to be necessary in order 
to survive.1 
ne of the fundamental goals of the European Community 
(EC) is the establishment of a common market,2 an objec-
tive codified in the Treaty Establishing the European Commu-
nity.3  During the last ten years, European nations have taken 
boundless steps to remove the physical, fiscal, and technical 
barriers that divided them.4  The results have been rewarding.  
The common market has already created over 2.5 million jobs 
  
 1. STEPHAN RAMMELOO, CORPORATIONS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 
(2001) [hereinafter RAMMELOO]. 
 2. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, part 1 
art. 2, O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY].  Under the Treaty: 
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common 
market and an economic and monetary union and by implementing 
the common policies or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 3a, to 
promote throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced de-
velopment of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary 
growth respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of 
economic performance, a high level of employment and of social pro-
tection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and 
economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States. 
Id.  At present, the following countries are Member States of the EC: Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom.  Europa, The European Union at a Glance, at 
http://europa.eu.int/abc/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2004). 
 3. EC TREATY, supra note 2, part 1 art. 2.  
 4. See generally Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the 
Commission to the European Council, COM(85)310 final (describing the com-
pletion of the European market in terms of the removal of “physical, technical 
and fiscal” barriers).   
O 
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and added about 900 billion euros to the economy.5  Studies 
show that if integration is completed, an additional five billion 
euros will flow into the economy.6  Nevertheless, this goal may 
not be realized if member states do not continue to take the 
necessary steps to integrate.7  
Company law is one area of law that is criticized for not keep-
ing up with the integration process.8  By treaty, EC citizens 
have the right to set up a business in any member state and 
receive the same treatment as a national doing business in that 
state.9  This is referred to as the freedom of establishment,10 and 
  
 5. A Healthy EU Single Market: Frits Bolkestein and Anne-Marie Michel 
(Radio Netherlands broadcast, Jan. 14, 2003), at http://www.rnw.nl/hotspots 
/html/eu030114.html.  
 6. Id.  
The IMA’s study, prepared by the Centre for European Economic Re-
search, a German institute whose initials are ZEW, estimates that a 
single market could bring Euro 5 billion ($5.8 billion) or more then a 
year in added economic benefits, and increase Europeans’ pension 
pots by about 9%.  Such sums may be largely guesswork, but the ob-
stacles to trading are clearly formidable and costly.  
Id.  
 7. Id. 
 8. Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Modern 
Regulatory Framework for Company law in Europe, Letter from the Chair-
man, (Nov. 4, 2002) [hereinafter High Level Group Report]. 
 9. EC TREATY, supra note 2, art. 48 (ex 58).  It states that:  
Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member 
State and having their registered office, central administration or 
principal place of business within the Community shall, for                  
the purposes of this Chapter, be treated in the same way as natural 
persons who are nationals of Member States. 
Id.  States and member states, in this Note, refer to the EC states. 
 10. EC TREATY, supra note 2, art. 42 (ex 52).  It states that:  
Restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Mem-
ber State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohib-
ited.  Such prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting 
up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member 
State established in the territory of any Member State.  Freedom of 
establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities 
as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in 
particular companies or firms within the meaning of the second para-
graph of Article 48, under the conditions laid down for its own na-
tionals by the law of the country where such establishment is ef-
fected, subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital. 
Id. 
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is codified in Articles 42 and 48 of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (The EC Treaty).11  However, companies 
with headquarters in more than one member state or companies 
that want to move from one state to another still face substan-
tial barriers.12  Article 293 of the EC Treaty 13 requires member 
states to negotiate and secure cross-border recognition for com-
panies, but states’ attempts to secure such recognition have 
been fruitless.  In 1956, member states negotiated the Hague 
Conference on the Mutual Recognition of Companies, which 
would have made recognition mandatory between signatories.14  
The Convention, however, was defeated.15  A similar draft treaty 
was defeated in 1968.16  Currently, member states are dead-
locked on this issue.  Lack of consensus about corporate recogni-
tion is neither consistent with the goal of a single market17 nor 
practical in an economic area where business transactions often 
involve more than one member state18 and corporations are ma-
jor players in the economy.19  
Not surprisingly, companies have found themselves at the 
center of the multi-national corporate recognition dispute.  For 
this reason, changes in the law have been prompted by litiga-
  
 11. Id.  
 12. Uwe Blaurock, Berger Lecture, Steps Toward a Uniform Corporate 
Law in the European Union, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 377, 379 (1998).  
 13. EC TREATY, supra note 2, art. 293 (ex 220).  This article states that:  
Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations 
with each other with a view to securing for the benefit of their na-
tionals: the mutual recognition of companies or firms within the 
meaning of the second paragraph of Art. 48 (ex 58), the retention of 
legal personality in the event of transfer of their seat from one coun-
try to another, and the possibility of mergers between companies or 
firms governed by the laws of different countries. 
Id. 
 14. RAMMELOO, supra note 1, at 24 (“The 1956 Draft Treaty of the Hague 
Conference on the Mutual Recognition of the Legal Personality of Compa-
nies”).  
 15. Id.  
 16. CHARLOTTE VILLIERS, EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW – TOWARD DEMOCRACY? 
16 (1998) [hereinafter VILLIERS]. This treaty was defeated because it was not 
ratified by the Netherlands. Id.  
 17. See generally RAMMELOO, supra note 1.  
 18. See High Level Group Report, supra note 8, at 101 (“There is wide de-
mand for community law to facilitate cross frontier restructuring.”).   
 19. RAMMELOO, supra note 1, at 1. 
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tion initiated by companies.  This Note examines the most re-
cent European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision on the recogni-
tion of companies in the matter of Überseering v. Nordic Con-
struction Company.20  This case, decided in June 2002, arises 
out of Germany’s refusal to recognize a Dutch corporation with 
its headquarters in Germany.  In the decision, the court held 
that the freedom of establishment preempts certain national 
laws that preclude recognition.  The decision is significant be-
cause it expands the scope of the freedom of establishment and 
prohibits member states from refusing to recognize companies 
that move their headquarters from one state to another.  
Part I of this Note provides background on corporate recogni-
tion theory in Europe and explains the legal and social impor-
tance of recognition theories.  Also, Part I illustrates attempts 
by the ECJ and the European legislature to alleviate legal prob-
lems that arise when a European corporation wants to move its 
headquarters to a new member state.  Next, Part II of this Note 
discusses Überseering and the court’s reasoning in that case.  
Part III examines the practical implications of the Überseering 
decision and how the Überseering decision requires member 
states to recognize companies that are formed in the European 
Union under certain circumstances.  Finally, this Note con-
cludes that although the Überseering decision does not entirely 
solve the problem of corporate recognition, it instructs new 
companies to forum-shop for a jurisdiction that will later allow 
them to emigrate to a new member state.  A new company must 
carefully choose its state of registration because the Überseering 
court interprets the freedom of establishment as giving a com-
pany the right to move to a new state, but not to emigrate from 
its home state.  
While the court could have gone further in its holding and 
made corporate recognition mandatory in all circumstances, the 
Überseering result is ultimately favorable to the goal of a single 
market because a recent European law creating a corporate 
form21 that is recognized throughout Europe largely excludes 
  
 20. Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company and 
Baumanagement GmbH, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919.  
 21. Council Regulation (EC) No. 2167/2001 (Oct. 8, 2001) [hereinafter SE 
Statute]. 
File: Gildea Macro Note 1123.doc Created on: 11/23/2004 4:29 PM Last Printed: 11/23/2004 4:30 PM 
2004] EUROPEAN COMPANY PASSPORT 261 
new companies.22  Thus, the Überseering ruling at least par-
tially fills the vacuum left by that law.  
I. BACKGROUND:  THE STATE OF CORPORATE LAW IN EUROPE  
A. An Overview of European Corporate Recognition Doctrines  
Each EC member state adheres to one of two fundamental 
corporate recognition doctrines: either the “real seat” or “place 
of incorporation” theory.23  Under the “place of incorporation” 
doctrine, the laws of the member state where the company is 
registered govern the company’s internal affairs.24  Those laws 
will govern the company’s legal personality even if it moves into 
another state.25  Under this theory, courts in the new state will 
recognize the company’s legal personality and apply the foreign 
laws that govern the company’s internal affairs if an internal 
affairs issue arises.26  This doctrine is subscribed to in Ireland, 
the U.K., Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.27  
The “place of incorporation” doctrine is beneficial for several 
reasons.  First, it allows a company to move its headquarters 
freely from one state to another state without losing its legal 
identity.28  If desirable, a company can move to a more competi-
  
 22. Id. at arts. 4(2), 17, 32, 35–37.  The requirements under the statute are 
also described infra in Part I (D) of this Note.  
 23. See generally Eddy Wymeersch, The Transfer of the Company’s Seat in 
European Company Law, (European Corporate Governance Institute, Work-
ing Paper No. 08/2003, 2003), available at http://www.ecgi.org/wp.  
 24. Christian Kersting, Corporate Choice of Law—a Comparison of the 
United States and European Systems and a Proposal for a European Directive, 
28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 37 (2002). 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id.  
 27. See David Charny, Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating 
Corporate Law Rules: An American Perspective on the “Race to the Bottom” in 
the European Communities, 423 HARV. INT’L L.J. 423, 428 (1991).  See also 
Werner F. Ebke, The “Real Seat” Doctrine in the Conflict of Corporate Laws, 
36 INT’L LAW. 1015, 1016 (2002) [hereinafter Ebke, The “Real Seat” Doctrine].  
This doctrine is also adhered to in the United States.  See REV. MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT 15.05(c) (1984) (“This Act does not authorize this state to regulate 
the organization or internal affairs of a foreign corporation authorized to 
transact business in this State.”).  Note that Switzerland is not an EU Mem-
ber State.  
 28. RAMMELOO, supra note 1, at 16. 
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tive market without being dissolved.29  Second, the “place of in-
corporation” theory gives management the autonomy to choose  
a jurisdiction that has laws most conducive to the company’s 
purpose.30  Finally, this theory makes it easy to ascertain the 
law applicable to a company’s internal affairs because the ap-
plicable law does not change even if the company moves to a 
new jurisdiction.31  This is a positive result for third parties 
such as creditors who want predictability as to which law will 
apply to an entity with a head-office in more than one state.32  
Also, this is a positive result for companies because they avoid 
complicated res judicata issues when all European courts apply 
a uniform set of laws to their internal affairs.33  
By contrast, under the “real seat” doctrine, a company’s in-
ternal affairs are governed by the laws of the member state 
where the company has its “real seat,” or headquarters.  Ger-
man courts have described the “real seat” as “the location where 
the internal management decisions are transformed into day-to-
day activities of the company.”34  A company must register or 
incorporate in the member state where it has its center of ad-
ministration; and if it does not, the company will not be recog-
nized as a legal entity.35  Under this view, if a company wants to 
move its headquarters to a new member state, it must dissolve 
and reincorporate.36  Dissolution is costly and impractical be-
cause of taxes and legal fees.37  Germany, France, Italy and 
Austria subscribe to the “real seat” doctrine.38  
  
 29. Id.  
 30. See Wymeersch, supra note 23, at 2.  
 31. RAMMELOO, supra note 1, at 17. 
 32. See id.  
 33. See Werner F. Ebke, Centros—Some Realities and Some Mysteries, 48 
AM. J. COMP. L. 623, 654 (2000) [hereinafter Ebke, Centros Mysteries]. 
 34. Wolf-Hennig Roth, From Centros to Ueberseering, Free Movement of 
Companies, Private International Law, and Community Law, 52 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 177, 181 (2003) citing BGH 21 Mar 1986, BGHZ 97, 269 at 272.  
 35. See generally Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919. 
 36. See Ebke, Centros Mysteries, supra note 33, at 624–25. 
 37. See Jens C. Dammann, The U.S. Concept of Granting Corporations 
Free Choice among State Corporate Law Regimes as a Model for the European 
Community, at 10 (Social Science Research Network Electronic Library, 
Working Paper File No SSRN_ID418660_code030715560.pdf, Aug. 04, 2003), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=418660 (“If a 
U.K. company moves its headquarters to Germany without reincorporating 
under German law, German courts will usually treat the organization as a 
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The “real seat” doctrine is favorable for a number of reasons.  
First, it does not burden local creditors with the task of re-
searching foreign corporate law.39  Second, the “real seat” doc-
trine allows member states to apply their laws to all companies 
headquartered in their territory.40 Presumably local lawmakers 
have the greatest interest in the activities of local companies, 
and they will enforce policy that is beneficial to the community 
as well as to the company.41  Finally, the “real seat” doctrine 
keeps companies from seeking out foreign legal systems that 
are more favorable to management and less favorable to share-
holders, workers, or creditors.42  In fact, the “real seat” doctrine 
was originally conceived for this purpose.43  Contemporary 
scholars still fear that if the “real seat” doctrine ceased to exist, 
many managers would reincorporate under lenient foreign legal 
systems to the detriment of local constituencies.44  
  
partnership, subjugating all its shareholders to unlimited liability.”) [herein-
after Dammann, Corporations Free Choice].   
 38. RAMMELOO, supra note 1, at 174-217.  Wymeersch, supra note 23, at 10.  
 39. Roth, supra note 34, at 202.   According to Roth: 
Conflicts rules allocate the burden of and the expenditures for 
information with regard to legal orders potenitally unknown to 
parties.  In this respect, the incorporation and the real seat doctrine 
obviously reflect strongly divergent conflicts policies with regard to 
adequate allocation of information costs considering the company as a 
legal product. 
Id. 
 40. See Wymeersch, supra note 23, at 2. 
 41. See RAMMELOO, supra note 1, at 14.  
 42. Id. at 18.  This argument is known as a “race to the bottom” argument. 
See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Dela-
ware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974) (coining the phrase “race to the bottom” in 
the corporate context).  
 43. See Charny, supra note 27, at 423, 428.  
 44. See, e.g., Catherine Barnard, Social Dumping and the Race to the Bot-
tom: Some Lessons for the European Union From Delaware?, 25 EURO. L. REV. 
57 (2000) (examining the “Delaware theory” in the European context).  See 
also Werner F. Ebke, The Limited Partnership and Transnational Combina-
tions of Business Forms: “Delaware Syndrome” Versus European Community 
Law, 22 INT’L LAW 191 (1988) (arguing that the liberal “incorporation doc-
trine” is not as workable in Europe as it is in the United States). See also 
Catherine Holst, European Company Law after Centros: Is the EU on the Road 
to Delaware?, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 323 (2002) (questioning whether the Dela-
ware effect will take place in Europe and suggesting that member states 
change their laws to achieve greater efficiency).  See also Wymeersch, supra 
note 23, at 4.  
File: Gildea Macro Note 1123.doc Created on:  11/23/2004 4:29 PM Last Printed: 11/23/2004 4:30 PM 
264 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 30:1 
B. Multi-State Business and the Transfer of the Seat 
The practical differences between “place of incorporation” ju-
risdictions and “real seat” jurisdictions materialize when a 
company moves from one jurisdiction to another.  If a company 
wants to move its headquarters to a different European state, a 
few important legal questions arise.45 First, whether the origi-
nal home state will allow the company to move without dissolu-
tion; second, whether the new state (the host state) will recog-
nize the company as a legal entity; and third, whether the new 
state will apply the laws of the place of incorporation, thus rec-
ognizing the company’s legal personality.  
Let us suppose company X sets up a branch in neighboring 
member state Y.  Its operation in Y is very successful.  Com-
pany X opens a factory and an office building in state Y to han-
dle its business there, and soon its sales in state Y account for 
most of its business.  In addition, a new shareholder from state 
Y becomes a 51% stakeholder in company X.  The growth in 
business seems to have shifted the real seat of company X to 
state Y.46 
In another hypothetical, suppose a company in state J decides 
to move its headquarters to a new office building in state K be-
cause property taxes are lower in state K (which may be only a 
few miles away from the old building in state J).  Again, a com-
pany has transferred its seat or headquarters from one member 
state to another.  The consequences of these changes differ de-
pending on whether the states follow the “place of incorpora-
tion” doctrine or the “real seat” doctrine. 
If the companies in the hypothetical moved from one “place of 
incorporation” state to another (from the U.K. to the Nether-
lands, for example), the legal consequences are few.  The com-
panies will have to settle with local tax authorities in the origi-
  
 45. Other legal questions may also arise, such as taxation, creditor’s rights 
or the treatment of contracts in the host state.  These issues are important but 
they are beyond the scope of this Note.  
 46. These facts are very similar to the facts of Überseering.  See generally 
Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919. 
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nal state,47 but, otherwise, the new state will recognize the com-
panies as foreign legal entities.48 
If the companies moved their headquarters from a “real seat” 
state to a “place of incorporation” state, the “place of incorpora-
tion” state will recognize the companies’ identities.49  The “place 
of incorporation” state will apply the laws of the original place 
of incorporation to the company.  However, most “real seat” 
states will not allow companies to move abroad without forcing 
the company to wind up and dissolve.  For this reason, it is 
usually impracticable, if not impossible, for a company to move 
from a “real seat” state to a “place of incorporation” state.50  
  
 47. See Case 81/87, The Queen v. H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of 
Internal Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust PLC, [1988] E.C.R. 
5483 [hereinafter Daily Mail].   
 48. See Ebke, The “Real Seat” Doctrine, supra note 27, at 1015, 1016.  See 
Dammann, Corporations Free Choice, supra note 37, at 19-21.  Some “place of 
incorporation” states, including the U.K. and Ireland, do not simply allow 
corporations to change their domicile and retain the laws of their home state.  
Id. Corporations from those states will have to move by effecting a merger.  
Id.   
 49. See Roth, supra note 34, at 184.  The Roth piece gives this example: 
A German limited company (GmbH) that moves its centre of admini-
stration, but not its registered seat, to England (moving out) will be 
treated as a company still governed by German law: The German 
conflicts rule leads to an application of the English conflicts rule, 
which in turn calls for the application of the law of incorporation (in 
this case German law).  
Id. 
 50. See RAMMELOO, supra note 1.  German law prohibits a company from 
moving out of Germany.  Id. at 192.  France may allow such a transfer after a 
unanimous shareholders vote and an agreement with the host state, but it is 
uncertain that such a transfer is actually envisioned under French law. Id. at 
215–16.  Italian law allows domestic companies to emigrate, but does not al-
low foreign companies to immigrate without dissolution. Id. at 224.  See also 
Wymeersch, supra note 23, at 10, 11.   She states that: 
In other jurisdictions [apart from Germany, where it is never al-
lowed], the emigration is allowed under certain conditions.  These 
vary according to jurisdictions: In Spain, there should be a treaty in 
force between the exit and the entry state…In France, the majority 
opinion defends that the seat may be transferred without dissolution 
of the company…This rule allows the supermajority decision only in 
case France has concluded an international convention with the entry 
state about the maintenance of legal personality.  However, as obvi-
ously France has not entered into any such convention, the rule is in-
applicable. 
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If the companies moved their headquarters from a “place of 
incorporation” state to a “real seat” state, the result will be just 
as severe.  The “real seat” state will refuse to recognize the 
companies unless they dissolve and reincorporate under its 
laws.51  Dissolution entails paying legal fees and, in most cases, 
capital gains taxes on all assets.52  
The most complicated scenario arises if the companies moved 
from one “real seat” state to another.  The original states of in-
corporation probably will not permit the companies to emigrate 
without dissolving.53  Then, even if the companies move, the 
host state will deny recognition and require the companies to 
reincorporate.  Companies wanting to move their headquarters 
in or out of a “real seat” state face considerable obstacles and 
may find such a move impossible.  EC law does little to alleviate 
the disadvantage that those companies face.   
Passing a “corporate headquarters transfer” directive could 
solve the problems presented by the “real seat” and “place of 
incorporation” doctrines.  Scholars and the European Commis-
sion have considered this solution.54  The High Level Group on 
Company Law Experts, part of the European Commission,55 re-
quested the creation of a 14th directive dealing exclusively with 
  
Id. 
 51. See Dammann, Corporations Free Choice, supra note 37, at 10.  
 52. Id. at 9.  
 53. See RAMMELOO, supra note 1, at 192, 215.  See also Wymeersch, supra 
note 23, at 10, 11. Dammann, Corporations Free Choice, supra note 37, at 16 
(for a company to successfully transfer and reincorporate under a new state’s 
legal system, a state must either “allow corporations to perform a so-called 
identity-preserving transfer of domicile” or reincorporate through a cross 
boarder merger but, “in the European Community… corporations will often 
find that neither of the two above-described options [are] available”). Ger-
many, for example, does not allow domestic companies to transfer their domi-
cile or to merge with a foreign corporation.  Id. at 19, 21.  
 54. See Kersting, supra note 24, at 67.  See also High Level Group Report, 
supra note 8, at 111.  Ebke proposed another possible solution to the problem 
of divergent corporate law theories in Europe in his response to the Centros 
case.  He suggested that, as in the U.S., European academics, judges and law-
yers could create a code of best practices or a model law for Europe to propel 
the movement toward integration.  See Ebke, Centros Mysteries, supra note 
33, at 658, 659.  He points particularly to the ALI’s Principles of Corporate 
Governance and the ABA’s Revised Model Business Corporation Act. Id. 
 55. Press Release, EU Institutions, Commission Welcomes Experts’ Report 
on Company Law and Corporate Governance (Nov. 4, 2002).  
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the seat-transfer issue.56  The Commission plans to present a 
proposal for the directive sometime within the near future.57  
However, there is no guarantee that a directive will be ratified 
or that it will completely solve the conflict between the “real 
seat” and “place of incorporation” doctrine.  Recent legislation 
dealing with similar issues has been vetoed58 or badly compro-
mised by competing interests within the Union.59  
C. Beyond Recognition: The “Real Seat” Doctrine and the Protec-
tion of Labor Laws and Minimum Capital Contributions  
European states have different linguistic, cultural, historical, 
and legal backgrounds, and thus, have an interest in preserving 
their local values through the use of local law.60  States follow 
the “real seat” approach because they want to protect other na-
tional laws from being sidestepped by forum-shopping.  At the 
center of the Überseering dispute are laws requiring minimum 
capital deposits61 and laws requiring labor participation in 
management.62  Although laws concerning labor mainly affect 
large companies and minimum capital requirements mainly 
  
 56. High Level Group Report, supra note 8, at 111.  
 57. Europa, Company Law and Corporate Governance,  at      
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/company/seat-transfer/2004-
consult_en.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2004).  
 58. Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concern-
ing Takeover and Other General Bids, 1989 O.J. (C 64) 8.  See generally 
Christian Kirchner and Richard W. Painter, Takeover Defenses Under Dela-
ware Law, the Proposed Thirteenth EU Directive and the New German Take-
over Law: Comparison and Recommendations for Reform, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 
451 (2002) (analyzing the failed 13th Directive on Takeover Bids and compar-
ing it to the more defensive German and American regimes).  
 59. SE Statute, supra note 21.  See also Stefano Lombardo and Piero Pa-
sotti, The ‘Societas Europaea’: a Network Economics Approach, at 8 (European 
Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper No. 19/2004, 2004), available 
at http://www.ecgi.org/wp.  
 60. See James L. Gibson and Gregory A. Caldeira, The Legal Culture of 
Europe, 30 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 55, 80 (1996) (“We fully expect that differences 
in legal cultures will play an even greater role in the ways in which EC law 
gets implemented within each of the Member States.”).  See also Jens C. 
Dammann, Freedom of Choice in European Corporate Law, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 
477, 485–87 (2004).   
 61. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, paras. 87, 89. 
 62. Id.  
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affect smaller, less capitalized companies, both laws protect 
other constituents such as workers and creditors, respectively.  
Many European states impose a minimum capital require-
ment on entities that request limited liability.63  Theoretically, 
the requirement protects creditors and potential tort victims by 
assuring that assets are paid into the company.64  European Un-
ion law also provides minimum capital requirements for public 
companies.65  Moreover, a recent law passed by the legislature  
establishing a European corporate form imposes a minimum 
capital requirement of 120,000 Euros.66  In recent years, how-
ever, the ECJ has cast a skeptical eye on minimum capital re-
quirements imposed by member states.  In the Centros case, for 
example, the court suggested that minimum capital require-
ments did not achieve the goal of protecting creditors67 because 
concerned creditors could easily protect themselves by asking 
for some type of security interest or personal guarantee.68  
Nevertheless, the current state of European Community law 
does not indicate that minimum capital requirements will soon 
  
 63. Minimum capital requirements are imposed in Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland (only public companies), Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.  SETTING UP A COMPANY IN THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A COUNTRY BY COUNTRY GUIDE (1989) [hereinafter 
SETTING UP A COMPANY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY].  Similar laws exist in 
the U.S. if corporations have stock with par value. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. 
LAW §§ 504, 506, 513(a) (“Upon issue by a corporation of shares with a par 
value, the consideration received therefore shall constitute stated capital to 
the extent of the par value of such shares.”).  However, corporations often 
have the option to issue no-par stock.  See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 501(a) 
(“Each class shall consist of either shares with par value or shares without par 
value.”).  
 64. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, para. 16.  But see Luca Enriques 
and Johnathan R. Macey, Creditors Versus Capital Formation: The Case 
Against the European Union, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1165 (2001) (arguing that 
minimal capital requirements are a “costly and inefficient” mechanism that 
provide little protection for creditors).  
 65. Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC, of 13 December 1976 on coordina-
tion of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and 
others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of 
the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of 
public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their 
capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent, 1977 O.J. (L 26).   
 66. Id.   
 67. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. V. Erhvervs-og Selskabeetyrelsen, [1999] 
E.C.R. I-1459, para. 35. 
 68. SE Statute, supra note 21, art. 4(2). 
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not indicate that minimum capital requirements will soon be a 
thing of the past.  
Many EC member states also have laws requiring some form 
of labor participation in corporate management.69  France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and a number of other member states 
have groups called “works councils”70 that allow workers infor-
mational and consulting rights within companies.71  However, 
Germany hosts the most debated system of worker participation 
in Europe.72 Co-determination is the German practice by which 
large companies are required to have labor representation on 
  
 69. See generally SETTING UP A COMPANY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 
supra note 63.  In Belgium, public and private companies that have more than 
100 employees must have a “Works Council” that meets once per month to 
review employment policies.  Id. at 28, 35. In Denmark, in public and private 
companies with more than thirty five workers, employees can demand repre-
sentation on the board of directors, and if the majority of the employees are in 
favor, labor can demand equal representation on the board.  Id. at 48, 61.  In 
Ireland, in semi-state-owned public and private companies, employees can 
participate in some board activities.  Id. at 124, 128.  In Luxembourg, public 
and private companies with more than fifteen employees must have a workers 
delegation and must hold at least six meetings per year.  In companies with 
more than 150 employees, there must be a joint works council that is com-
prised of an equal number of employees and employers.  Id. at 166-167, 174.  
In the Netherlands, public and private companies with more than thirty-five 
employees must create a “Works Council” whose approval is necessary for 
certain actions.  Id. at 186, 194.  Finland, Austria, and Sweden also have laws 
that require workers in a public limited liability company to be represented by 
an administrative organ of the company.  See also CARLA TAVARES DA COSTA & 
ALEXANDER DE MEESTER BILREIRO, THE EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE 73 (2003) 
[hereinafter COSTA]. 
 70. GROUPS OF COMPANIES IN THE EEC 17, 147, 253 (Eddy Wymeersch ed. 
1993) [hereinafter GROUPS OF COMPANIES]. In Belgium: “The Law of 20 Sep-
tember 1948 provides for the installation of a works or ‘enterprise council’ in 
the more important enterprises when there [are]…100 or more employees.”  
Id. at 17.  In the Netherlands: “The right of employees to have a say in corpo-
rate policy is concerned-is mainly embodied in the so-called ‘structural provi-
sions’ and the Works Councils Act 1979.” Id.  A company with more than 100 
employees must have a works council.  Id. at 253.  
 71. Id.  
 72. GROUPS OF COMPANIES, supra note 70, at 90-92. In Germany, “in con-
trast to other legal systems, workers are entitled to co-determination in accor-
dance with German Business Constitution Law 47(1).” Id. at 91.  See also 
Benjamin A. Streeter, III, Co-Determination in West Germany – Through the 
Best (and Worst) of Times, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 981, 984, 998 (1982).  
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the board of directors.73  Under German law, a company must 
have a two-tiered board, composed of the Aufsichtsrat (the up-
per level or supervisory board) and a Vorstand (lower level or 
management board).74  If a company has more than 500 employ-
ees, one third of the members of the Aufsichtsrat must be labor 
representatives.75 Half of the Aufsichtsrat must be comprised of 
labor representatives in companies that are either in the iron, 
coal or steel industry or have more than 2,000 employees.76  Co-
determination in Germany began in the hard times after the 
Second World War as a concession to employees to compensate 
for the lack of cash available for wages.77  In the contemporary 
setting, co-determination is viewed as a political arrangement 
that affects wealth distribution and extends the value of democ-
racy to the private sphere.78  German company law is designed 
not only to maximize shareholder wealth, but also to serve the 
workforce.79  The “real seat” doctrine is a tool that preserves 
Germany’s demanding co-determination provisions by prevent-
ing companies from incorporating under more lenient legal sys-
tems where workers have no place in corporate governance.80 
D. The Societas Europaea 
Since the commencement of the European Union, lawmakers 
have suggested that a European corporate form would be useful 
  
 73. Eddy Wymeersch, The Corporate Governance Discussion in Some 
European States, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 11 
(DD. Prentice & P.R.J. Holland eds., 1993).  
 74. Id.  
 75. SETTING UP A COMPANY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 63, at 
93, 101.  This includes both public and private companies. Id.  
 76. Id.  
 77. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a The-
ory of the Firm, 21 IOWA J. CORP. L. 657, 719 (1996) (arguing that participa-
tory management is highly effective).  
 78. Interest Groups, Co-determination at http://xroads.virginia.edu/~MA 
98/pollklas/thesis/codglossary.html (last visited July 4, 2004) (paraphrasing 
Bundesregierung Deutschland). 
 79. See Jens Dammann, The Future of Codetermination After Centros: Will 
German Corporate Law Move Closer to the US Model?, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 607, 608 (2003) (arguing that the Centros decision does not destroy co-
determination but will bring changes in European corporate law) [hereinafter 
Dammann, Codetermination After Centros]. 
 80. COSTA, supra note 69, at 5.   
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in the common market.81  The European Commission submitted 
drafts of a Societas Europaea (“SE”) corporate form in 1970, 
1975, 1989, 82 and 1991.83  The original SE proposal was vetoed84 
by member states because the draft was too far beyond the 
reach of national corporate law.85  The 1989 and 1991 versions 
of the SE statute were grounded in national law, but still were 
unsatisfactory to states because of disagreements about co-
determination in Germany under the SE system.86  Finally, a 
compromise was reached.  On October 8, 2001, the Council 
passed regulation 2157/2001 establishing the SE.87  
The SE statute provides an alternative international corpo-
rate form that is recognized throughout Europe.  Its primary 
purpose is to provide companies with the means to expand over 
state lines without the high transaction costs associated with 
setting up subsidiaries in multiple states and legal systems.88  
Unlike other national corporate forms (especially those in “real 
seat” states), a SE can transfer its headquarters from one mem-
ber state to another without dissolution.89  Also, the SE could 
provide a company in a “real seat” jurisdiction with the means 
to move to another member state.90  
  
 81. See, e.g., Johan de Bruycker, EC Company Law—The European Com-
pany v. the European Economic Interest Grouping and the Harmonization of 
the National Company Laws, 21 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 191, 192, 199-200 
(1991).  See also Modernizing Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Gov-
ernance in the European Union—A Plan to Move Forward: Communication 
from the Commission to the Council and The European Parliament, COM 
(2003) final at 284 1.1.  Thus far, no directive dealing with these conflict of 
laws issues has been agreed upon, but a European corporate form has been 
passed.  The 10th and 14th directives would have dealt with harmonization in 
merger and acquisition law, but they did not pass.  High Level Group Report, 
supra note 8, at 111.  See also Blaurock, supra note 12, at 384.  
 82. Id.  
 83. COSTA, supra note 69, at 5. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 5. Terence L. Blackburn, The Societas Europea: The Evolving 
European Corporation Statute, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 685, 708, 750–52 (1993).  
 87. SE Statute, supra note 21.  See also COSTA, supra note 69, at 5. 
 88. See COSTA, supra note 69, at 11.   
 89. SE Statute, supra note 21, art. 1(3).  See also Lombardo and Pasotti, 
supra note 59, at 4.  
 90. Luca Enrique, Silence is Golden: The European Company Statute as a 
Catalyst for Company Law Arbitrage, at 5 (European Corporate Governance 
Institute, Working Paper No. 07/2003, March 2003), available at 
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However, the availability of the SE is limited.  A SE can be 
formed in only four ways: by a merger of companies from 
different member states;91 by the creation of a holding company 
with components in different member states;92 by the creation of 
a SE subsidiary of companies from at least two member states;93 
or by the conversion of a public limited company that has, for at 
least two years, had a subsidiary in another member state.94  
Additionally, the SE imposes a minimum paid-in capital re-
quirement of 120,000 Euros.95  Because of these formation re-
quirements, the SE is mainly a viable option for large compa-
nies.96  
Unlike the corporate forms used in the individual member 
states, the SE statute resolves the difficulties related to recog-
nition and the choice of applicable law if the SE moves its head-
quarters.  Recognition is mandatory under the SE statute97 but 
the SE must register in the state where it has headquarters.98  
The company laws of the state of registration govern the com-
pany.  If the SE wishes to move its headquarters to a new 
member state, it can do so without dissolution.99  However, the 
company must re-register and subject itself to the laws of the 
new member state.100  If the company fails to register in the 
state of its headquarters, the statute imposes sanctions such as 
  
http://www.ecgi.org/wp (“Hence, for instance, the formation by a merger of an 
SE of the Irish type between an ‘active’ Portuguese company and a newly 
formed Irish shell company totally owned by the former would be legal.”) 
[hereinafter Enriques, Arbitrage]. 
 91. SE Statute, supra note 21, art. 17. 
 92. Id. at art. 32. 
 93. Id. at arts. 35-36. 
 94. Id. at art. 37. 
 95. Id. at art. 4(2).  120,000 Euros = 151,416 U.S. Dollars as of October 21, 
2004.  Oanda, the Currency Site, at http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2004). 
 96. High Level Group Report, supra note 8, at 114, 117.  See also Charles 
de Navacelle, Legislative Development: Council Regulation No. 2157/2001 of 
October 8, 2001 Establishing the European Company Statute, 9 COLUM. J. 
EUR. L. 199, 201 (2002). 
 97. SE Statute, supra note 21, art. 1(3) (“The SE shall have legal personal-
ity.”).  
 98. Id. at art. 5. 
 99. Id. at art. 8. 
 100. Companies can object to laws of a new member state unless those laws 
are considered part of public interest.  Id. at art. 8(14).  
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liquidation.101  Therefore, the SE is probably the only type of 
company that can move its headquarters from one “real seat” 
state to another without dissolution.102  Conversely, a company 
formed under the laws of a “place of incorporation” member 
state can move to another “place of incorporation” member state 
without dissolution and without changing the laws applicable to 
its internal affairs.  Thus, companies in a “place of incorpora-
tion” member state may find that their national corporate form 
is more versatile than the SE form.103   
In addition to providing a minimum capital requirement, the 
SE statute also provides guidelines for labor participation.  
These guidelines are located in a supplemental directive.104  In 
the directive, priority is given to the agreements between man-
agement and employees before the entity became a SE.105  The 
directive has a default provision if an agreement cannot be 
reached because the SE spans jurisdictions where different 
groups of workers have different rights of participation.106  The 
default provision includes mandatory worker participation if 
most of the employees of the combined entities of the SE had 
participation rights before the SE was formed.107  The law is 
structured so that a company domiciled in a state where worker 
participation is mandatory cannot escape this requirement by 
becoming a SE.108  
The SE simplifies some multinational corporate activities, but 
it is not a viable solution for all companies.  First of all, transac-
tion costs associated with the SE will initially be restrictive 
since the statute has yet to be interpreted by courts.  The stat-
ute leaves room for interpretation because it does not draw 
  
 101. Id. at art. 64.  
 102. See Navacelle, supra note 96, at 200.  
 103. See Wymeersch, supra note 23, at 31–32 (“Before the court rendered its 
opinion in the Überseering case, [the SE was a] considerable innovation[].  
One will have to determine to what extent Überseering will have a dampening 
effect of the innovative function of the Statute’s rule.”).  
 104. EC Directive 2001/86/EC (Oct. 8, 2001) (Supplementing the Statute for 
a European Company with Regard to the Involvement of Employees).   
 105. Id. at Preamble, section 18.  
 106. Id. at Annex. 
 107. Id. at Preamble, section 18.  
 108. Id. at Preamble, section 3.  
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bright lines between SE law and national law.109  Second, the 
problem of cross-border recognition still exists because the SE 
form is not available for all companies and excludes less capital-
ized companies.110  Third, companies in “place of incorporation” 
states may find that their national laws are more flexible than 
the SE.111  Finally, companies in “real seat” states may avoid the 
SE in order to pursue creative ways to avoid worker participa-
tion.  Thus, even with the introduction of a SE statute, most 
European companies will still face difficulties if they desire to 
move their headquarters to a new state.   
E. Case Law Interpreting Corporate Mobility Under The  
EC Treaty   
1. The Daily Mail Case 
In recent years, the ECJ has made several important rulings 
interpreting the effect of the freedom of establishment on corpo-
rate entities.  In the Daily Mail case, Daily Mail and General 
Trust (“Daily Mail”), an investment holding company, sought to 
change its principal place of business from the U.K. to the 
Netherlands.112   The U.K., which is a “place of incorporation” 
state, permits a U.K. company to move its principal place of 
business to another state without dissolution.  However, a com-
pany must obtain permission from the local government to 
move its head office113 because in the U.K., a company is liable 
for taxes in the jurisdiction of its headquarters.114   Daily Mail 
asked local officials for permission to move, but moved without 
an answer115 because it believed that the freedom of establish-
ment permitted it to move its headquarters to a new member 
  
 109. Enriques, Arbitrage, supra note 90, at 10, 11 (“The boundaries between 
nations and EU law will have to be determined.”).  See also Lombardo and 
Pasotti, supra note 59, at 18.  
 110. High Level Group Report, supra note 8, at 117 (admitting a need for a 
statute dealing with small and midsize companies, called “SME’s”).  
 111. Id. at 114 (“Opponents [to the SE] also argue that the European corpo-
rate environment should not be cluttered up with yet another legal form”). 
 112. Daily Mail, [1988] E.C.R. 5483.  
 113. Id. at para. 5. 
 114. Id. at paras. 6, 7. 
 115. Id. at para. 6. 
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state without authorization from its home state.116  Its purpose 
for moving, as perceived by the court, was to avoid British capi-
tal gains taxes.117  
In this case, the ECJ ruled that the freedom of establishment 
did not apply to a company that transfers its headquarters to 
another member state.118  Therefore, the tax authorities had the 
right to decline Daily Mail’s request to move out of the U.K.119  
The court reasoned that corporations are unlike humans in that 
corporations only exist because of a privilege extended by na-
tional law.  Thus, the freedom of establishment provides them 
only limited rights.120  Although the Daily Mail court narrowly 
defined the effect of the freedom of establishment on companies, 
subsequent decisions suggest that the Daily Mail interpretation 
was colored by the possible existence of tax evasion.  Daily Mail 
has not been completely overturned, but has been viewed nar-
rowly by the ECJ in subsequent decisions.   
2. The Centros Case 
In the Centros case,121 Danish nationals Mr. and Mrs. Bryde 
registered a company in the U.K. in order to do business 
through a branch in Denmark.  They structured the corporate 
entity in this way to avoid the minimum capital requirement 
imposed in Denmark.122  When the Brydes attempted to register 
their branch, Danish authorities refused their application based 
on the conclusion that the U.K. wing of the business existed 
only as a fraudulent holding company for the Danish branch.123  
The court disagreed and ruled that registering a company in 
another member state to avoid minimum capital laws is not 
fraud, even if the company does not intend to do business in the 
  
 116. Id. at para. 8.  
 117. Id. at para. 8. 
 118. Id. at para. 25. 
 119. Id. at para. 24. 
 120. Id. at para. 19 (“Unlike natural persons, companies are creatures of the 
law and in the present state of Community law, creatures of national law.  
They exist only by virtue of the varying national legislation which determines 
their incorporation and functioning.”). 
 121. Centros, [1999] E.C.R. I-1459.  
 122. Id. at paras. 3, 4, 14.    
 123. Id. at paras. 7, 23. 
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state of incorporation.124  Under the freedom of establishment, 
when a company is properly formed in accordance with the laws 
of a member state, other member states must recognize a 
branch of that company.125  After the Centros decision, propo-
nents of the “real seat” doctrine wondered if allowing foreign 
companies to operate branches in “real seat” states would un-
dermine their doctrine.126 They feared any company could incor-
porate aboard and operate in a “real seat” state under the guise 
of a branch to avoid local law.127 
In Centros, the court also ruled that member states have the 
right to make laws that impose additional requirements on for-
eign corporations, so long as those laws are “applied in a non-
discriminatory manner, justified by imperative requirements in 
the general interest [of society], do not go beyond what is neces-
sary,” and “are suitable for securing the attainment of the objec-
tive which they pursue.”128  The court held that because credi-
tors were already on notice that the Brydes’ company was a for-
eign corporation, and thus could have asked for a guarantee or 
security interest if they were concerned, Danish minimum capi-
tal requirements did not meet this four-part “necessity” test.129  
  
 124. Id. at paras. 17, 18, 29. The court has reaffirmed this test in a recent 
case.  See Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amster-
dam v. Inspire Art Ltd., [2003] ECJ CELEX LEXIS 444, at para. 133.   
 125. Centros, [1999] E.C.R. I-1459, at para. 39. 
 126. See generally Dammann, Codetermination After Centros, supra note 79 
(arguing that codetermination will probably survive the scrutiny of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice).  See also Ebke, Centros Mysteries, supra note 33 (dis-
cussing the effects of Centros on national law).  But see Holst, supra note 44 
(arguing that Centros may not change the conflict of laws in the EU, but 
member states probably should change them voluntarily to increase effi-
ciency).  
 127. RAMMELOO, supra note 1, at 72.  In regard to Centros he explains that: 
A number of German commentators seem to be convinced that this 
ruling means that member states are obliged to relinquish the Sitz-
theorie…From now on, natural and legal foreign persons alike should 
be welcomed in Germany or any other member state of the European 
Union; the latter category would no longer have to worry about ad-
justing their structure to the company laws of the state of establish-
ment.  Germany had better get used to…companies established 
abroad, having their real seat on German territory.  
Id. 
 128. Centros, [1999] E.C.R. I-1459, para. 33. 
 129. Id. at para. 37.  
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This part of the decision left member states wondering whether 
worker participation requirements would pass the four-part test 
in Centros.130  Their question was answered in part by the Über-
seering decision.   
II. THE ÜBERSEERING DECISION AND THE CONTINUED 
EXPANSION OF THE FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT  
A. The Factual Background 
Überseering BV (Beslolen Vennootschap), a company that 
was registered under Dutch corporate law in August, 1990,131 
was acquired by two German citizens in December, 1995.132  
Three years earlier, Überseering had hired Nordic Construction 
Company Baumanagement GmbH (“NCC”), the defendants in 
this case, to paint a structure on a piece of property that it ac-
quired in Germany.133  Claiming that the work was defective, 
Überseering sued NCC for breach of contract in a German re-
gional court.134  The court dismissed the case, ruling that Über-
seering lacked standing to bring the suit.135  Under German con-
flict of laws, which follows the “real seat” doctrine, a court must 
apply German law to a company with its headquarters or center 
of administration in Germany.136  The court concluded that 
when German nationals purchased the shares of Überseering, 
the company’s center of administration inadvertently shifted to 
Germany.137  Since the company did not register in Germany, 
the court refused to recognize the entity.  Although this conclu-
sion is not codified, it is strictly adhered to in German courts.138  
It is also worth noting that German law will recognize an un-
registered foreign corporation as a defendant.  Before bringing 
  
 130. See generally Dammann, Codetermination After Centros, supra note 79.  
 131. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, para. 2. 
 132. Id. at para. 7. 
 133. Id. at para. 6. 
 134. Id. at paras. 6, 8.  Überseering sued in the lower German court, which 
is called the Landgericht. Id.  
 135. Id. at paras. 8, 9. 
 136. Id. at para. 4. 
 137. Id. at para. 9. 
 138. Id. 
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this case, Überseering defended a case in a German court 
against one of its architects.139  
The German appeals court, the Oberlandesgericht, affirmed 
the decision of the lower court.140  The Bundesgerichtshof,141 the 
highest court, requested a preliminary ruling from the ECJ.142  
The question was framed as follows: 
whether, where a company formed in accordance with the leg-
islation of a Member State (A) in which it has its registered of-
fice is deemed, under the law of another Member State (B), to 
have moved its actual centre of administration to Member 
State B, Articles 43 EC and 48 EC preclude Member State B 
from denying the company legal capacity, and therefore the 
capacity to bring legal proceedings before its national courts in 
order to enforce rights under a contract with a company estab-
lished in Member State B.143  
The court concluded that Articles 43 and 48 preclude member 
state B (or Germany, in this case) from refusing to recognize 
company A (Überseering in this case).144  Thus, a company can 
move its headquarters from an “incorporation” state to a “real 
seat” state and gain recognition if the company was properly 
formed in accordance with the laws of any member state.  The 
court found Überseering analogous to Centros because both ex-
amine the relationship between a host state and a corpora-
tion.145  The court held that despite the broad language in the 
Daily Mail decision, it is distinguishable from this case be-
cause146 it applies to restrictions on a company’s ability to move 
  
 139. Id. at para. 12. 
 140. Id. at para. 10. 
 141. Id. at para. 11. 
 142. Id. at para. 21.  
 143. Id. at para. 22.  
 144. Id. at para. 94.  The decision states: 
Such objectives cannot, however, justify denying the legal capacity 
and, consequently, the capacity to be a party to legal proceedings of a 
company properly incorporated in another Member State in which it 
has its registered office. Such a measure is tantamount to an outright 
negation of the freedom of establishment.  
Id. 
 145. Id. at 40.   
 146. Centros, [1999] E.C.R. I-1459, paras. 39, 62, 65. 
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out of its home state, not a company’s right to recognition in a 
host state.147  
B. Überseering’s Holding and Reasoning 
The defendant, NCC, was joined in its argument by Germany, 
Spain and Italy.  These parties gave three major arguments in 
favor of the German interpretation of the freedom of establish-
ment.  First, they claimed that corporate recognition is not 
mandatory under current EC law without individual state con-
sent.148  Second, they maintained that the facts of Daily Mail, 
and not Centros, are analogous to the present proceeding.149  
And third, they argued that protecting German substantive la-
bor and capital laws justified sanctions against foreign compa-
nies that operated in Germany.150   
The defendants further argued that a state is under no obli-
gation to recognize a foreign company unless it consents by con-
vention or treaty.151  According to the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, “Member States shall, so far as is neces-
sary, enter into negotiations with each other with a view to se-
curing for the benefit of their nationals...the mutual recognition 
of companies or firms.”152 The negotiations that followed the 
Treaty produced the Convention on the Mutual Recognition of 
Companies and Legal Persons, 153 but it was never entered into 
force.154   The defendants maintained that the text of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community proves that the framers 
of the EC acknowledged differences in recognition standards 
  
 147. Id. at paras. 69-71.  
 148. Id. at paras. 23, 24.  
 149. Id. at paras. 29, 31. 
 150. Id. at paras. 88, 89. 
 151. Id. at para. 23.  
 152. EC TREATY, supra note 2, art. 293 (ex 220).   The Treaty states that: 
Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations 
with each other with a view to securing for the benefit of their na-
tionals: the mutual recognition of companies or firms within the 
meaning of the second paragraph of Art. 48 (ex 58), the retention of 
legal personality in the event of transfer of their seat from one coun-
try to another, and the possibility of mergers between companies or 
firms governed by the laws of different countries.   
Id.    
 153. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, paras. 25, 26. 
 154. Id. at paras. 26-28. 
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within the Community and elected to keep those differences 
intact.155  Therefore, the defendants asserted that Germany has 
no obligation to recognize a foreign company’s existence.156  
The court rejected this argument157 and agreed with the 
European Commission which joined the Netherlands, the U.K. 
and the European Free Trade Surveillance Authority (“EFTA”) 
in making arguments on behalf of Überseering.  These parties 
asserted that ECJ case law should facilitate harmonization in 
areas when it is necessary to uphold the freedom of establish-
ment.158  Article 293 affords states the opportunity to negotiate 
for the mutual recognition of companies, but not the right to 
deny recognition.159  The court found that the right to recogni-
tion falls within the freedom of establishment160 and that com-
panies that are formed in accordance with the law of a member 
state and have their central administration and principal place 
of business in a member state are entitled to the same benefits 
as natural persons.161 Likewise, in the EC, commercial estab-
lishments can set up and manage a business under the same 
conditions as domestic businesses without losing their legal 
personality.  This mandatory recognition approach to the free-
dom of establishment is consistent with Centros.  
The defendants also encouraged the court to follow its prece-
dent in the Daily Mail case, which restricts the application of 
the freedom of establishment to companies.  In Daily Mail, the 
court plainly stated that the freedom of establishment does not 
extend to the transfer of a company’s seat.162  In Überseering, 
  
 155. Id. at para. 26.  
 156. Id. Spain also argues that the “General Programme for the abolition of 
restrictions on the freedom of establishment, adopted in Brussels on Dec. 18, 
1961,” mentions that companies should have a continuous link with the econ-
omy of a member state in order to take advantage of the abolitions of restric-
tions on freedom of establishment. Id. at paras. 33, 34. The court holds that 
this requirement only applies to companies that do not have a link to the EU. 
Id. at para. 74. 
 157. Id. at para. 60 (“It is not necessary for the Member States to adopt a 
convention on the mutual recognition of companies in order for companies 
meeting the conditions set out in Article 48 EC to exercise the freedom of es-
tablishment conferred on them by Articles 43 EC and 48 EC.”).   
 158. Id. at para. 37. 
 159. Id. at paras. 54, 55, 56, 98. 
 160. Id. at para. 54. 
 161. Id. at para. 56. 
 162. Id at para. 24. 
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the court distinguished Daily Mail because that case “concerned 
relations between a company and the Member State under 
whose laws it had been incorporated” and “the present case con-
cerns the recognition by one Member State of a company incor-
porated under the law of another Member State.”163  Also, it 
noted that Daily Mail was not a case about the denial of a com-
pany’s legal personality.  Therefore, Daily Mail is still good law 
when applied to a company and its home state, but not when 
applied to a company and a foreign state.164  
Finally, the defendants argued that the restrictions on Über-
seering were justified by the need to protect third parties 
through German labor law, tax law, minimum capital law, and 
private company law.165   While the court gave a nod to these 
interests, it concluded that none of them outweighed the fun-
damental right of recognition provided for by the freedom of 
establishment.166  The court also noted that “it is not certain 
that requirements associated with a minimum amount of share 
capital are an effective way of protecting creditors,” and Ger-
man capital laws are, “in some respects less strict” than those 
in other states.167  However, the decision concedes that in some 
instances laws that protect the “general good” could justify a 
restriction on a corporation’s the freedom of establishment.168  
III. EFFECTS AND ANALYSIS OF ÜBERSEERING 
A. The Practical Effects of Überseering on SE’s and Domestic 
Companies  
In Überseering, the court expanded Centros by once again 
finding that the freedom of establishment preempts state con-
  
 163. Id. at para. 62. 
 164. Id. at para. 62.  
 165. Id. at paras. 87-90.  
 166. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, paras. 36, 92, 93.  See also Centros, 
[1999] E.C.R. I-1459, para. 37 (the laws must “be applied in a non-
discriminatory manner, they must be justified by imperative requirements in 
the general interest” [of society], “they must not go beyond what is necessary” 
and they must “be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which 
they pursue”). 
 167. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, paras. 87, 91.  
 168. Id. at para. 92.  
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flict of laws theories.169  Before Überseering, many scholars be-
lieved that the freedom of establishment only preempted laws 
that applied to a company’s secondary establishment. 170  The 
Überseering court did not view the freedom of establishment in 
such narrow terms.  It held that “Article 48 provides for the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on the freedom of estab-
lishment of individuals,”171 and companies, not just their sub-
sidiaries, are to be treated the same as individuals.172   However, 
the holding is ambiguous when applied to companies that are 
registered in “real seat” states.  Also, the combination of the 
Überseering holding and the SE statute presents new ques-
tions.173  
1. Moving From a “Place of Incorporation” State to Another 
“Place of Incorporation” State  
Prior to Überseering, a company from a “place of incorpora-
tion” state could move its center of administration to another 
“place of incorporation” state and the new state would recognize 
the company as a legal entity.174 The Überseering decision does 
not change this result, but it does confirm the assertion in Cen-
tros that “it is not inconceivable that overriding requirements 
relating to the general interest, such as the protection of the 
interests of creditors, minority shareholders, employees and 
even taxation authorities may, in certain circumstances and 
  
 169. See generally Dominic E. Robertson, Überseering, Nailing the Coffin on 
Sitztheorie?, 24 THE COMPANY LAWYER 184 (2003) (arguing that the Überseer-
ing decision supports an expansive view of the freedom of establishment and 
narrows the validity of the “real seat” doctrine). 
 170. Ebke, Centros Mysteries, supra note 33, at 654.  
 171. VILLIERS, supra note 16, at 18. 
 172. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, para. 56.  
 173. See Wymeersch, supra note 23, at 31. See also Jamie Dorman Storey, 
The European Company Statute: The Vision v. The Reality and the Challenges 
Lying Ahead, at 7 (Leiden University, The Netherlands, Working Paper, 
2002), available at http://www.juridix.net/eu_soc/essay3_se.htm (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2004). 
 174. Ebke, The “Real Seat” Doctrine, supra note 27, at 36.  But see Dam-
mann, Corporations Free Choice, supra note 37, at 19.  Some states, even 
those that adhere strictly to the place of incorporation doctrine do not allow 
corporations to change their “statutory domicile and retain their legal person-
ality.”  Id. This is probably because the states do not want to forgo tax collec-
tion.  
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subject to certain conditions, justify restrictions on the freedom 
of establishment”175 so long as the restrictions do not negate the 
freedom of establishment.176  Presumably, a host state could im-
pose special guarantees for creditors177 or special capital regula-
tions178 on foreign companies, but it cannot require companies to 
reincorporate as a prerequisite to recognition.179  Companies 
would be wise to consider the possible range of requirements 
that may fall under the “general good” exception before moving 
to a new state.180  For example, after the decision in Centros, the 
Danish government imposed a tax requirement on foreign com-
panies in lieu of a minimum capital requirement.181   Likewise, 
Germany still may find a way to require labor participation in 
foreign companies that are doing business in Germany without 
offending the freedom of establishment.182   
However, in the recent Inspire Art183 case, the ECJ gave a 
strict interpretation to the “general good” exception.  This strict 
interpretation, along with the court’s refusal to apply the “gen-
eral good” exception in Überseering, may indicate a high bar for 
the application of the exception.  In Inspire Art, a psuedo-
foreign company that was registered in the U.K. and operating 
in the Netherlands184 argued that aggressive Dutch laws de-
manding additional requirements for foreign corporations185 en-
  
 175. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, para. 92. 
 176. Id. at para. 81. 
 177. Centros, [1999] E.C.R. I-1459, para. 21. 
 178. See Roth, supra note 34, at 201. 
 179. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, para. 81. 
 180. Wymeersch, supra note 23, at 26.  
 181. Kersting, supra note 24, at 63 (“In a reaction to Centros, Denmark has 
enacted a tax law that requires foreign corporations to put up a guarantee,” 
which is “the equivalent of the minimum capital requirement.”).  
 182. Id.  
 183. See Inspire Art, [2003] ECJ CELEX LEXIS 444.  
 184. Id. at paras. 34, 35.  
 185. Id. at paras. 23-28. Dutch law imposes special requirements on for-
mally foreign companies: companies who are registered outside of the Nether-
lands, but conduct no business in their state of registration.  The require-
ments include “various obligations concerning the company’s registration in 
the commercial register, an indication of that status in all the documents pro-
duced by it, the minimum share capital and the drawing-up, production and 
publication of the annual documents.” Id.  The law also imposes “penalties in 
case of non-compliance with those provisions.” Id. at para. 23.  The law also 
states that “directors [are] to be jointly and severally liable with the company 
for legal acts carried out in the name of the company during their directorship 
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croached upon the freedom of establishment because they im-
posed obligations on foreign companies that “render the right of 
establishment markedly less attractive for those companies.”186  
In its response, the Netherlands claimed that extra require-
ments for foreign corporations were justified because of “over-
riding reasons related to the public interest” such as 
“counter[ing] fraud, protect[ing] creditors and ensur[ing] that 
tax inspections are effective and that business dealings are 
fair.”187  In this case, the court found that the extra require-
ments imposed by the Netherlands were discriminatory.188  It 
held that if national laws treat foreign companies differently 
from national companies, then those laws are contrary to EC 
law.189  Thus, Inspire Art and Überseering maintain that a “gen-
eral good” exception exists, but exceptions that are discrimina-
tory or unduly burdensome violate the freedom of establish-
ment.  
2. Moving From a “Place of Incorporation” State  
to a “Real Seat” State 
Prior to Überseering, if a company moved its center of ad-
ministration from a “place of incorporation” state to a “real 
seat” state, the “real seat” state would refuse to recognize the 
company.  The court attacked this result and held that denying 
recognition in such a case would offend the freedom of estab-
  
until the requirement of registration in the commercial register has been ful-
filled.” Id. at para. 25.  In addition, the law requires that “it [is] to be indicated 
that the company is formally foreign and prohibits the making of statements 
in documents or publications which give the false impression that the under-
taking belongs to a Netherlands legal person.”  Id. at para. 26.  Moreover, the 
law says, “the subscribed capital of a formally foreign company must be at 
least equal to the minimum amount required of Netherlands limited compa-
nies.” Id. at para. 27. And it requires that “until the conditions relating to 
capital and paid-up share capital have been satisfied, the directors are jointly 
and severally liable with the company for all legal acts carried out during 
their directorship which are binding on the company.”  Id.  “The directors of a 
formally foreign company are likewise jointly and severally responsible for the 
company’s acts if the capital subscribed and paid-up falls below the minimum 
required, having originally satisfied the minimum capital requirement…”  Id. 
at para. 28. 
 186. Id. at para. 90. 
 187. Id. at para. 109.  
 188. Id. at paras. 127, 128.  
 189. Id. at para. 64. 
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lishment.190 However, crucial questions about such a move still 
remain.  For example, the court requires that a “real seat” host 
state recognize a European foreign company in its territory.  
But, the court does not specify whether the host state must ap-
ply internal affairs law from the state of registration.  Thus, it 
is still unclear how far the host state must go in recognizing the 
legal personality of the company191 or whether current case law, 
taken as a whole, sufficiently requires member states to apply 
the law of a corporation’s place of registration.192  In Überseer-
ing, the court stated that “[t]he location of the[] registered of-
fice, central administration or principal place of business consti-
tutes the connecting factor with the legal system of a particular 
Member State in the same way as does nationality in the case of 
a natural person.”193  Of course states will likely want to assert 
their own laws wherever possible.194  However, it is unclear if a 
member state can refuse to apply the laws of the place of incor-
poration without offending the freedom of establishment.195 
Apart from offending the EC Treaty, the possibility that a 
host state will apply its own law to the internal affairs of a for-
eign corporation gives rise to practical considerations.  If the 
laws of the original state of registration do not apply to a com-
pany residing in a host state, complicated res judicata situa-
tions could occur if internal affairs issues are adjudicated in 
both the home and host state.196  Presumably, these inconsisten-
cies will give rise to burdensome legal expenses and come as a 
surprise to creditors.  This is especially true in a case like Über-
seering, where there is no indication that the plaintiff inten-
tionally moved its center of administration to Germany, or that 
other member states would consider Überseering’s actions a 
  
 190. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, para. 82. 
 191. Luca Cerioni, The Überseering Ruling: The Eve of a “Revolution” for the 
Possibilities of Companies’ Migration Throughout the European Community?, 
10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 117, 125–27  (2003). 
 192. Dammann, Corporations Free Choice, supra note 37, at 15.  
 193. Id. at para. 57.  But see High Level Group Report, supra note 8, at 106.  
Third states are likely not to be involved in the transfer of the seat, but if they 
are, they should apply the law of the state of incorporation.  Id.  
 194. Dammann, Corporations Free Choice, supra note 37, at 15. 
 195. Cerioni, supra note 191, at 125–27. 
 196. Ebke, Centros Mysteries, supra note 33, at 654.  
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transfer of its seat.197   In Überseering, the EFTA persuasively 
argued that:  
the refusal to recognise Überseering’s right to be a party to le-
gal proceedings in Germany by reason of the apparently unso-
licited transfer of its actual centre of administration to Ger-
many is indicative of the lack of certainty which may be caused 
in cross-border transactions when the different private inter-
national law rules of the Member States are applied. Since 
characterization as a company's actual centre of administra-
tion turns, to a large extent, on the facts, it is always possible 
that different national legal systems and, within them, differ-
ent courts may have divergent views on what is an actual cen-
tre of administration. Moreover, it is increasingly difficult to 
identify a company's actual centre of administration in an in-
ternational, computerized economy, in which the physical 
presence of decision-makers becomes increasingly unneces-
sary.198  
The EFTA poses a valid issue unsolved by Überseering.  Un-
der current case law, the issue of “legal personality” and appli-
cable law appear to be at the discretion of the member states so 
long as states do not negate the freedom of establishment in 
their interpretation. 
3. Moving Out of a “Real Seat” State and Into Either a “Place of 
Incorporation” State or a “Real Seat” State 
When a company wants to move its center of administration 
out of a “real seat” state and into another state, Überseering 
requires the new state to recognize the company.  However, the 
holding does not guarantee a company’s ability to move from its 
original state without permission.199  Even in the recent Inspire 
Art case, the court continued to distinguish the company-host 
state relationship interpreted in Centros, Überseering and In-
spire Art, and the company-home state relationship interpreted 
in Daily Mail.200  Writers in this area question the fairness of 
  
 197. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, para. 63 (“Überseering never gave 
any indication that it intended to transfer its seat to Germany.”).   
 198. Id. at para. 51 (emphasis added).  
 199. Wymeersch, supra note 23, at 10, 11 (“In Germany, and according to 
some legal writers in France as well, the emigration results in the company 
being completely dissolved.”).  
 200. See Inspire Art, [2003] ECJ CELEX LEXIS 444, para. 103.  
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granting EC companies the freedom to immigrate to a new 
member state, without granting them the broad right to emi-
grate from their home state.201  
One scholar suggested that the four-part ‘necessity test’ in 
Centros be used to evaluate state restrictions on the emigration 
of domestic companies.202 This proposal is reasonable because it 
takes into account the valid concerns states may have about 
companies moving and failing to settle with creditors or tax au-
thorities.203  However, under current EC law, member states can 
trap domestic companies that want to move out of their terri-
tory without justification.  Whether the denial of the right to 
emigrate is a negation of the freedom of establishment will have 
to be considered in future decisions.  
4. Moving with the SE Form 
Überseering is, in some ways, inconsistent with the SE stat-
ute.  On one hand, Überseering requires a host state to recog-
nize a European company operating within its borders even if 
the company is incorporated in another state. 204  That require-
ment follows a “place of incorporation” approach, although it 
does not endorse all elements of the “place of incorporation” doc-
trine.205  On the other hand, the SE statute requires the SE to 
register in the state of its headquarters, which is synonymous 
with the “real seat” doctrine.206  Therefore, if a SE moves its 
headquarters from one state to another without reregistering in 
the new state, the Überseering court would require recognition 
under the freedom of establishment, 207 but the SE statute would 
impose sanctions such as dissolution.208  The introduction of the 
SE and the decision in the Überseering case were nearly con-
  
 201. See Roth, supra note 34, at 206.  See also Wymeersch, supra note 23, at 
10.  
 202. Wymeersch, supra note 23, at 28–29. 
 203. Id.  
 204. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, para 82. 
 205. Enriques, Arbitrage, supra note 90, at 6.  See infra Part III B (1) of this 
Note.  
 206. Lombardo and Pasotti, supra note 59, at 10 (“Article 7 SE-Reg. makes a 
clear choice in favor of the real seat theory as the conflict of law rule to be 
applied to European Companies registered in the Member States.”).  
 207. Id. at para. 81. 
 208. SE Statute, supra note 21, art. 8.  If the company fails to register in the 
state where it has its real seat, it could be dissolved.  Id. at art. 64. 
File: Gildea Macro Note 1123.doc Created on:  11/23/2004 4:29 PM Last Printed: 11/23/2004 4:30 PM 
288 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 30:1 
temporaneous,209 therefore a practical application of both re-
gimes is probably necessary to see if this conflict is of any con-
sequence.  
Despite inconsistencies with each other, both the SE statute 
and the Überseering holding are beneficial.  Some companies 
may decide that although Überseering facilitates mobility for 
domestic companies, the SE statute is beneficial because its 
renvoi technique to national law provides clarity as to what law 
applies to the entity’s internal affairs.210  Also, because the SE 
statute is the result of a political compromise, states are less 
likely to disfavor SE’s.211  Inspire Art provides an illustration of 
the types of laws that member states pass to restrain disfavored 
types of foreign corporations.  However, since Überseering was 
couched in constitutional terms, the SE statute’s registration 
requirement may turn out to be an anomaly.212  
B. Analysis  
1. The “Real Seat” Doctrine in the Wake of  Überseering  
Some academics view the Überseering decision as a clear 
message that the “real seat” doctrine is preempted by the free-
dom of establishment.213  Authors went so far as to say that the 
whole idea of a “real seat” or “center of administration” is out-
dated in today’s world of modern technology and superior com-
munication.214   These conclusions stem logically from Überseer-
ing because the court ignored German conflict of laws rules 
stemming from the “real seat” doctrine and because Überseer-
ing’s center of administration was ubiquitous.215  
However, it is unlikely that the Überseering decision is broad 
enough to eradicate the “real seat” doctrine completely.   First, 
the Überseering decision does not allow companies the freedom 
to move out of their home state.  Thus, the free movement asso-
  
 209. The SE statute was adopted at the end of 2001 and the Überseering 
decision was published in June 2002.  
 210. Enriques, Arbitrage, supra note 90, at 10.  
 211. Lombardo and Pasotti, supra note 59, at 8.  
 212. Id. at 12.  
 213. See, e.g., Dammann, Corporations Free Choice, supra note 37, at 6.  
 214. Enriques, supra note 90, at 6.  See also Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-
9919, para. 51.   
 215. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, para. 63. 
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ciated with the “place of incorporation” doctrine is still unreal-
ized for many EC companies. 216   Second, the decision does not 
go so far as to suggest that the use of a “territorial” or “real 
seat” approach is inappropriate in all circumstances.  On the 
contrary, it signals that either the “location of the[] registered 
office, central administration or principal place of business” 
could connect a company to a legal system.217  Moreover, the 
recent SE Statute, and even the defeated Draft 14th directive, 
endorse some aspects of the “real seat” doctrine.218  Thus, it can-
not be concluded that the Überseering decision marks the end of 
the “real seat” doctrine altogether.    
2. Forum-Shopping and Arbitrage After Überseering 
The right to move corporate headquarters or set up a branch 
in any EC state could cause companies to forum-shop for corpo-
rate charters,219 favorable tax regimes or mobility.  Scholars 
  
 216. See Roth, supra note 34, at 207 (“It is to be deplored that the Court 
goes only half the way: The judgment is a disappointment as to the issue of 
moving out.”).  See also Wymeersch, supra note 23, at 18 (“The court’s reason-
ing leaves substantial uneasiness: the argument that freedom of establish-
ment related only to immigration, but leaves the states free to deal with emi-
gration… is rather theoretical and leaves reality aside.”).  See also Cerioni, 
supra note 191, at 129.  That author states that: 
The Court has adopted an halfway approach towards the acceptance 
of the incorporation system, because this system can be regarded as 
recognized to be the general rule just from the point of view of the host 
Member State but not from the point of view of the State in which a 
company is formed and from which this company may wish to mi-
grate. (emphasis in original).  
Id. 
 217. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, para 57. 
 218. Lombardo and Pasotti, Network Economics Approach, supra note 59, at 
10.  Also, because the Überseering decision goes beyond the rights of mobility 
granted by the legislative body, it may prompt new legislation that protects 
the “real seat” doctrine.  
 219. See Dammann, Corporations Free Choice, supra note 37, at 6–7.  See 
also Cerioni, supra note 191, at 129.   According to Cerioni: 
Second, and as a result, the present state of national company laws 
after the Überseering ruling EC law may essentially offer new oppor-
tunities for intra-EC ‘migration’ to those companies formed in coun-
tries adopting the incorporation system.  In principle, these compa-
nies are not prevented from moving their ‘primary establishment’ 
abroad and, for this reason, could add a new dimension to their ‘fo-
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speculate that the Überseering decision pushes Europe further 
towards a regime of free choice in the adoption of corporate 
charters, although scholars disagree as to whether this phe-
nomenon will cause a negative race-to-the-bottom or a positive 
race-to-the-top for corporate charters.220  Scholars also speculate 
that the Überseering decision will prompt existing companies to 
move their headquarters to host states with the most favorable 
tax regime.221  This Note proposes, in addition, that companies 
will consider forum-shopping for mobility.  If a company regis-
ters in a state that allows domestic companies to move out, then 
the company can later relocate for better proximity to labor or 
natural resources, or to alter its tax regime.  Being able to make 
this type of move is particularly important in the EC context, 
because the internal market is expanding, and in the future, tax 
incentives and inexpensive labor or resources may be located in 
a state that is not even a member of the EC today.   
Moreover, as one scholar pointed out “The Member States 
adopting the incorporation system tend to be—within the EC—
the States characterized by a tradition of liberal company law 
and, at the same time, by the most favorable tax regimes in 
various respects.”222  Thus, it is possible that the increased mo-
bility will cause companies to migrate toward liberal states, and 
cause states that prohibit emigration, impose high taxes, and 
inflict tough, conservative corporate laws to become more com-
petitive.   
3. The Result  
Although the Überseering decision does not dispose of the 
“real seat” doctrine or give clear rules for corporate mobility, the 
result is proper considering the goal of a common market, the 
spirit of compromise within the Union, and the narrow question 
presented to the court.  Corporations are a major force in the 
  
rum-shopping’ practices involving both the company law and the cor-
porate taxation aspects.  
Id. 
 220. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.  
 221. Cerioni, supra note 191, at 130, 139 (arguing that companies will try to 
register so that their places of incorporation are in a states with favorable 
company laws and their headquarters are in states where taxes are favor-
able).  
 222. Id.  
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European economy, and true integration cannot be achieved 
when companies are denied recognition.  However, the court in 
Überseering was not well positioned to solve deep-rooted differ-
ences in corporate and conflict of laws doctrines within the 
European Community.  Thus, many questions are left open af-
ter the decision.  
This Note asserts that Überseering, whether intentionally or 
not, applies the freedom of establishment in a way most benefi-
cial to new companies.  This is a positive result because new 
companies are the very entities that are excluded from the SE 
statute.223  Before Überseering, a new company that wanted to 
move its headquarters out of a “real seat” state would have to 
wait until it had the capital and interstate connections to be-
come a SE.224  New companies now have another option that old 
companies, already established in states that restrict emigra-
tion, do not have.  Based on Centros, new entities in “real seat” 
states can register shell corporations in “place of incorporation” 
states merely to reap the benefits of the foreign legal regime.225  
After Überseering, it is apparent that a company can register a 
shell corporation in a “place of incorporation” state, set up its 
headquarters in any state, and move its headquarters to any 
state.226  Hence, new companies in “real seat” states will be in-
clined to register in a member state that permits mobility and 
emigration of domestic corporations.  Without this option, many 
new companies would be left to register in “real seat” states 
that will not allow them to move out, even if such a move be-
came economically beneficial.  Überseering allows new compa-
nies to forum-shop for mobility and later move their headquar-
ters to a state with the labor resources, natural resources, con-
sumer markets, tax regime, and/or corporate regulations neces-
sary to ensure continued success in the ever-expanding and 
ever-changing European marketplace.  
  
 223. High Level Group Report, supra note 8, at 114. 
 224. SE Statute, supra note 21, at arts. 4(2), 17, 32, 35, 36, 37.  
 225. Centros, [1999] E.C.R. I-1459, para. 39.  See also Überseering, [2002] 
E.C.R. I-9919, ruling 1.  
 226. But see Roth, supra note 34, at 208 (It is unclear if the “law stands on 
equal footing with regard to the formation of companies.”).  Id. at 208.  
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IV. CONCLUSION  
Unless a European directive is adopted, different national 
systems of corporate recognition will persist in Europe.  Both 
theories of corporate recognition discussed in this Note have 
benefits.  However, the “place of incorporation” doctrine coexists 
best with the goal of a single European market because it rec-
ognizes foreign companies and the laws that govern their inter-
nal affairs and it allows companies to move to a new state.  
Nonetheless, various European member states prefer the “real 
seat” doctrine because it gives them control over the legal enti-
ties in their territory.  
Moreover, both of these national systems of corporate recog-
nition are being chipped away by the decisions of the European 
Court of Justice and by new statutes and directives.  Presently, 
a hybrid system of recognition exists in Europe. It consists of 
national rules, EC rules, and a somewhat substantial zone of 
ambiguity between the two regimes.  The Überseering decision 
is important because it sends a clear message that ambiguities 
will be resolved in favor of the Community and the single mar-
ket.  
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